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COMMENT: THE FLINT WATER CRISIS: A NATIONAL 
WARNING OF FAILING INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Andrew J. Lawton* 
 
I look at the Flint, Michigan Water Crisis from a combined 
perspective that broadens the scope of one of the worst manmade 
environmental disasters in the history of the United States.  The 
goal of this examination is to bring attention to preventable 
environmental catastrophes, and put a spotlight on the policies 
and governing philosophies, which aggregated into neglect to the 
health of the people of Flint.  I briefly analyze Michigan’s 
emergency manager law’s role in fostering the poor oversight that 
allowed the crisis to spiral out of control.  I then pivot to the 
nation’s water infrastructure and regulatory environment at 
large.  Finally, I examine proposals of public policy for financing 
the repair and removal of toxic lead pipes from other 
municipalities.  This paper highlights the dire consequences of 
environmental degradation through lead and poorly managed 
public utilities.  It is my hope that such tragedies can be prevented 
by an increased public awareness. 
  
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Marquette University Law School, May 2018. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Flint water crisis has proven to be one of the nation’s 
worst environmental disasters.1  Thousands of Flint residents 
have had inadequate access to water because of government 
officials’ inability to properly treat the water supply being 
diverted from the Flint river.2  Many have been sickened, now 
suffer from lead poisoning, or worse, fatally succumbed to 
mistreated water.3  This paper will focus on the legal and 
bureaucratic mechanisms that allowed the crisis to unfold and 
persist.  In Michigan, particularly, the emergency manager law 
the governor instituted to improve the state’s fiscal situation 
allowed the crisis to go unnoticed and worsen.4  This law allowed 
the governor to suspend local and city governments across the 
state, and appoint a single person with the authority to manage 
all operations of the city.5  Flint’s crisis, at least in part, stems 
from a lack of care or accountability from emergency managers or 
state officials.6 
After looking at the local perspective of Flint, this paper’s 
focus will shift to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
the legal mechanisms that existed and failed to safeguard against 
the poor decision making of Flint’s emergency manager.  The EPA 
was deterred by a dwindling allocation of funding and failed to act 
when it had the clear authority to do so.7 
 
 1.  Mark Berman & Brady Dennis, Flint Water Falls Below Federal Lead Limits, 
but Residents are Still Asked to Use Filtered Water, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/01/24/flint-water-falls-
below-federal-lead-limits-but-residents-still-asked-to-use-filtered-water/?utm_ 
term=.d3a30cdab9df [https://perma.cc/44KU-BVX6]. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  See Christianna Silva, Flint Now: Water Crisis Could Result in Manslaughter 
Charge for Michigan’s Top Medical Official, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 10, 2017), 
http://www.newsweek.com/flint-now-water-crisis-could-result-manslaughter-charges-
michigans-top-medical-681779 [https://perma.cc/V5SK-7Z32]; see also Jen 
Christensen et al., Flint Lead Poisoning: Living With Uncertainty, Long-Term, CNN 
(Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/04/health/flint-lead-exposure-long-term-
pain/index.html [https://perma.cc/9VQA-KU28].   
 4.  Brie D. Sherwin, Pride and Prejudice and Administrative Zombies: How 
Economic Woes, Outdated Environmental Regulations and State Exceptionalism 
Failed Flint Michigan, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 683 (2017). 
 5.  See id. at 682-83.   
 6.  Id at 663. 
 7.  Watchdog: EPA Delayed Emergency Order for 7 Months in Flint Water Crisis, 
CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nation 
world/midwest/ct-watchdog-epa-delay-flint-water-crisis-20161020-story.html [https: 
//perma.cc/U6KW-SHUK]; Glenn Thrush & Coral Davenport, Donald Trump Slashes 
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Finally, this paper will advocate for broadly overhauling the 
funding and bureaucratic structure, which failed to safeguard the 
people of Flint and perhaps many other communities nationwide, 
underscoring the national imperative for governments at all 
levels to be properly funded for the good of public health.  The 
people of Flint’s concerns over the lack of the most basic of all 
human needs, clean water, have been largely ignored.8  The 
failure to properly address this crisis is a national failing that has 
serious implications for other public health crises going forward. 
II. FLINT: A FAMILIAR URBAN STORY IN CRISIS 
On April 25, 2014, the city of Flint, Michigan switched its 
water supply from Detroit to the Flint River to save the city a few 
million dollars in costs while waiting for construction to finish on 
a regional pipeline to supply water from Lake Huron.9  
Regulations to prevent contamination of the water supply were 
already in place through policies like the Safe Water Drinking 
Act, which every municipality is required to comply with.10  
Followed properly, these legislative acts have dramatically 
improved drinking water quality since enactment.11  But in Flint, 
these regulations were not followed properly, and scores of people 
have been sickened or lead poisoned, and thousands more lacked 
basic water access.12 
The context for this bureaucratic failure is set by a common 
story throughout the American Rust Belt.13  Flint is a city 
 
Funds E.P.A. and State Department, N.Y. TIMES (Mar 15, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/us/politics/budget-epa-state-department-cuts. 
html [https://perma.cc/58AG-P8MG]. 
 8.  Ryan Felton & Oliver Milman, Flint Water Crisis: Michigan Officials Ignored 
EPA Warnings About Toxicity, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/03/flint-water-crisis-congress-
michigan-officials-ignored-epa-warnings-lead [https://perma.cc/VK2B-HDT2].  
 9.  Flint Water Crisis: A Timeline, MSNBC (Jan. 27, 2016), http:// 
www.msnbc.com/msnbc/flint-water-crisis-timeline [https://perma.cc/L4L9-79QJ]. 
 10.  See generally Safety of Public Water Systems, 42 U.S.C. § 300 (2010). 
 11.  Celebrating a Public Protections Milestone: The 40th Anniversary of the Clean 
Water Act, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www. 
foreffectivegov.org/clean-water-act-40th-anniversary [https://perma.cc/ TMV3-JCNV]. 
 12.  Merrit Kennedy, Led-Laced Water in Flint: A Step-by-Step Look at the 
Makings of a Crisis, NPR (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/04/20/465545378/lead-laced-water-in-flint-a-step-by-step-look-at-the-
makings-of-a-crisis [https://perma.cc/FY7U-QQMW]. 
 13.  STEVEN P. DANDANEAU, A TOWN ABANDONED: FLINT, MICHIGAN, CONFRONTS 
DEINDUSTRIALIZATION xx (Larry Bennett & Ronald Edsforth eds., State University of 
New York Press 1996). 
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infamous for the closing of its auto plants, and serves as a case 
study of globalization and corporate management squeezing great 
industrial cities of their jobs.14  After World War II, the city was 
an economic powerhouse with General Motors factories producing 
Chevrolet cars and Buicks.15  But the plants closed in the 1980s, 
which depressed the economy of Flint.16  The city has never really 
recovered after the loss of the auto jobs and economic activity 
associated with them.17  The United States census shows that by 
2010, the city had lost almost a third of its population from the 
1980s.18  Flint has been plagued by poverty and rampant crime, 
averaging a violent crime rate four times the national average.19  
Almost 42% of the city lives below the poverty line, and the 
median income for a household is about $24,862.20 Cities like Flint 
are horror stories of deindustrialization: the number of people 
living in the city collapses, which leads to declining tax revenues, 
which means fewer public services and a vicious spiral of economic 
decline.21  All of these problems were further exacerbated by 
economic downturns like the Great Recession in 2008.22  In 2012, 
Flint was facing a $19 million deficit.23 
These economic conditions have created a political 
environment in which politicians have sought to impose strict 
fiscal responsibility.24  This has generally included policies of cuts 
 
 14.  Id. at xx-xxi. 
 15.  Id.; Auto Industry, MICH. HIST., http://michiganhistory.leadr.msu.edu/auto-
industry/ [https://perma.cc/3YVH-DPQZ] (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).  
 16.  Dandaneau, supra note 13, at xxi. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Flint City, Mich. (2010); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Flint 
City, Mich. (1980). 
 19.  Sarah Ganim & Linh Tran, How Tap Water Became Toxic in Flint, Michigan, 
CNN (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/11/health/toxic-tap-water-flint-
michigan/ [https://perma.cc/C4UG-4CEU]; Reported Annual Crime in Flint, 
http://www.areavibes.com/flint-mi/crime/ [https://perma.cc/E5AB-UENK] (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2017). 
 20.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Flint City, Mich. (2016). 
 21.  Annie Snider, Flint’s Other Water Crisis: Money, POLITICO (Mar. 7, 2016), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/flint-lead-water-contamination-money-220391 
[https://perma.cc/3867-CG5T]; Dandaneau, supra note 13, at xx. 
 22.  Edward Hoogterp, Great Recession Leaves Michigan Poorer, Census Numbers 
Show, MICH. NEWS (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf 
/2011/10/great_recession_leaves_michiga.html [https://perma.cc/DE7P-RGWU]. 
 23.  Steve Carmody, Flint May Pursue Loan to Pay Off Remaining Budget Deficit, 
MICH. RADIO (April 9, 2015), http://michiganradio.org/post/flint-may-pursue-loan-pay-
remaining-budget-deficit [https://perma.cc/JV3P-N3BB]. 
 24.  Eric Levitz, The Republican Party Must Answer for What It Did to Kansas 
and Louisiana, N.Y. MAG. (Mar. 18, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/ 
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to both taxes and public spending for all things, including 
infrastructure investment.25  This stringent governing philosophy 
of the governors and legislatures in states, like Wisconsin, 
Kansas, and Michigan, has led to vastly reduced public sectors 
and investment.26  In 2011, Michigan Governor, Rick Snyder 
signed Act 4, the state’s “emergency manager law.”27  This 
measure had existed in some form since 1990, but was 
strengthened by giving unchallenged authority to the managers 
under Act 4.28  The act’s goal was to help cities in financial distress 
like Flint and Detroit prosper again.29  The law allows a manager 
to be appointed and in charge of a city’s finances and municipal 
decisions, with the ability to override all measures emplaced by 
the locally elected government.30  The manager can then sell off 
any assets he or she desires to accomplish financial solvency, 
while local government is unable to challenge any decision made 
by the manager.31  A Federal Appeals Court recently upheld the 
constitutionality of this law in September of 2016.32 
Like much of the Rust Belt, Michigan is plagued by aging 
water infrastructure that is in dire need of upgrade and funding.33  
The American Society of Civil Engineers gave Michigan a grade 
of D in its infrastructure investment in 2009, even before 
 
intelligencer/2016/03/gop-must-answer-for-what-it-did-to-kansas.html [https:// 
perma.cc/T3BX-7KYJ]. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id.; Lindsay Vanhulle, Budget Proposal Includes Spending, Cuts, Making 
Room for Tax Cut or Debt Payments, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Apr. 24, 2017), 
http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20170423/NEWS/170429949/budget-proposal-
includes-spending-cuts-making-room-for-tax-cut-or [https://perma.cc/5M3C-N79L]; 
David Bailey & Stefanie Carano, Wisconsin Governor Unveils Deep Spending Cuts, 
REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wisconsin-
budget/wisconsin-governor-unveils-deep-spending-cuts-idUSTRE72041C20110301 
[https://perma.cc/7MHL-7APD]. 
 27.  Josh Hakala, How Did We Get Here? A Look Back at Michigan’s Emergency 
Manager Law, MICH. RADIO (Feb. 3, 2016), http://michiganradio.org/post/how-did-we-
get-here-look-back-michigans-emergency-manager-law [https://perma.cc/D77E-
JG95]. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  See Sherwin, supra note 4, at 682-83. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Matt Vasilogambros, Upholding Michigan’s Emergency Manager Law, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/09/ 
michigan-emergency-manager-law/499658/ [https://perma.cc/7S86-YENH]. 
 33.  2009 Michigan Infrastructure Report Card, AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENGINEERS 1,17 
(2009), http://sections.asce.org/michigan/michiganreportcard/_files/ASCEMI-Infra 
structure-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CCY-Q46M]. 
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Governor Snyder signed the emergency manager law.34  This 
includes a D report card rating for drinking water infrastructure, 
and a C rating for treating wastewater.35  The group estimates 
that $13.8 billion is needed just in Michigan over the next 20 years 
to make the necessary upgrades for safe drinking water, and an 
additional $3.7 billion is needed for treating wastewater.36 
Slashing public expenditure while balancing the need to 
make necessary infrastructure upgrades is challenging.37  These 
budget priorities and pressures in a struggling city like Flint 
encouraged the emergency manager—whose primary focus was 
stabilizing the city’s budget—to push the city to save a few million 
dollars by immediately switching Flint’s water source while the 
city prepared to pipe in water from Lake Huron.38  While the city 
council symbolically supported the piping project to Lake Huron 
by a 7-1 vote, the council did not make any decision in regards to 
switching the city to the Flint River, and because of the emergency 
manager law, had no power to make the decision anyway.39 
III. BUREAUCRATIC FAILURE 
A. Negligence on the Part of Michigan State 
Government 
The responsibility for the Flint water crisis falls, first and 
foremost, on the officials of Flint and Michigan who repeatedly 
failed to heed warning signs.40  The most obvious failure is that 
the state government simply failed to properly test the water to 
assure that it was safe for drinking.41  Given the city’s industrial 
nature, the Flint River was victim to industrial runoff and waste 
since at least the 1830s.42  Furthering the river’s poor health, the 
auto manufacturers contributed their own share of chemicals over 
the booming industrial periods.43  Raw sewage was also disposed 
 
 34.  Id. at 1.  
 35.  Id. at 15, 48.  
 36.  Key Facts About Michigan’s In, AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENGINEERS (2017), 
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Michigan-
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8N9B-4Y5E]. 
 37.  See generally Vasilogambros, supra note 33. 
 38.  Sherwin, supra note 4, at 683, 698. 
 39.  Id. at 661. 
 40.  Id. at 663, 696. 
 41.  Id. at 661.  
 42.  Id. at 658. 
 43.  Id. at 659. 
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of in the river, and evidence of runoff of ammonia, chlorine, and 
phenol in the river is present.44  Multiple environmental 
disasters, including several accidental exposures to waste from 
ruptured sewer lines, also contribute to the river’s poor health.45  
As early as 1999, James Helmstetter, the Genesee County 
Director of Environmental Health, stated, “[a]s far as we know, 
no [community] uses the Flint River for a drinking water source,” 
in response to concerns about the excess pollution in the river.46  
According to experts, this repeated pollution made the river 
nineteen times more corrosive than the previous water system 
used by Flint from Detroit.47  Given the river’s history and 
exposure to various forms of pollution, the consequences of not 
testing the water were catastrophic.48 
In the summer of 2014, just a few months after the switch 
from the Detroit water supply to the Flint River, residents in 
parts of Flint were told by Flint officials to boil their water due to 
elevated levels of E. Coli in the tap water.49  In June 2014, there 
was an outbreak of Legionnaires disease, a pneumonia that forms 
when water is exposed to untreated sewage.50  The outbreak 
sickened eighty-nine and killed nine.51  To treat these problems, 
the city put disinfectants into the water supply, a byproduct of 
which was Trihalomethane (THM), a compound linked to organ 
failure as well as cancer.52  State officials publicly said that the 
outbreak of Legionnaires could not be linked to the Flint River 
water supply, but privately, state officials expressed concerns in 
internal emails of just that as early as October of 2014.53  In 
January of 2015, an environmental health supervisor stated he 
believed the outbreak closely corresponded with the switch to the 
Flint River water supply,54 but a spokesman for the State 
 
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Id. at 659-60. 
 46.  Id. at 660 (quoting Tim Carmondy, How Flint River Got so Toxic, THE VERGE 
(Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/2/26/11117022/flint-michigan-water-
crisis-lead-pollution-history [https://perma.cc/24QB-CZG2]). 
 47.  Ganim & Tran, supra note 19. 
 48.  Sherwin, supra note 4, at 661. 
 49.  Id. at 661-62. 
 50.  Id. at 662-63. 
 51.  Id. at 663. 
 52.  Id. at 662.  
 53.  Leonard N. Fleming & Michael Gerstein, Email: Legionnaires Assertion 
Would ‘Inflame Situation’, THE DETROIT NEWS (June 19, 2017), 
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2017/06/19/flint-
emails-legionnaires-water/103026954/ [https://perma.cc/3YPR-3XMW]. 
 54.  Jim Lynch, Michigan Officials Warned of Legionnaries’ Link, THE DETROIT 
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Department of Environmental Protection declared the suggestion 
“beyond irresponsible.”55 
In February of 2015, a utilities administrator tested the lead 
levels in the Flint family home of Lee Ann Walters.56  The 
administrator told her that lead levels in her water showed 104 
parts per billion in one test, and 397 in another, both far above 
the federally mandated action level of 15 parts per billion.57  Her 
four-year-old tested positive for lead poisoning.58  The city 
continually assured her and the community that the water was 
safe to drink.59  Walters contacted the EPA, and water specialist 
Miguel Del Toral traveled to Flint to conduct a test of her water.60  
Del Toral’s test revealed the water contained lead levels of 13,200 
parts per billion, which is twice the level of what is considered 
hazardous waste by the EPA.61 
The high concentration of lead in the water can be attributed 
to the toxic, bacteria-infested water’s severe corrosiveness.62  
Because the Flint River’s water is nineteen times more corrosive 
than the water from Detroit, toxic lead particles began flaking off 
Flint’s pipes, allowing lead to leach into the city’s water.63  
Residents immediately complained to the city about the color, 
smell, and taste of the water.64  State officials continued to assure 
residents that their water was completely safe to drink, as 
Michigan employee Michael Prysby did when he issued a press 
release for the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality 
(MDEQ) on April 25, 2014, stating, “[t]he quality of the water 
being put out meets all of our drinking water standards and Flint 
water is safe to drink.”65 
 
NEWS (Feb. 4, 2016) http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/02/04/flint-water-crisis-lehionnaires/79828822/ [https://perma.cc/6CS5-
B5W9]. 
 55.  Sherwin, supra note 4, at 664. 
 56.  Id. at 664, 694. 
 57.  Id. at 664, 693.  
 58.  Id. at 664. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Ganim & Tran, supra note 19. 
 63.  Id.  
 64.  Julie Bosman et al., As Water Problems Grew, Officials Belittled Complaints 
From Flint, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2016/01/21/us/flint-michigan-lead-water-crisis.html [https://perma.cc/E5QM-QTJ7]. 
 65.  Merrit Kennedy, Lead-Laced Water in Flint: A Step-By-Step Look At The 
Makings Of A Crisis, NPR (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/04/20/465545378/lead-laced-water-in-water-in0flint-a-step-by-step-look-at-
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To control corrosion of pipes, cities are required by the EPA 
to add corrosion control to the water supply to be within 
compliance of the Federal Safe Water Drinking Act of 1974.66  The 
act requires consistent testing and proper notice to users of the 
water when contaminants are detected.67  Corrosion control of 
lead pipes originated from the EPA in a 1991 regulation known as 
the Lead and Copper Rule (LCR), which tried to mitigate the 
immense costs required for upending the entire plumbing of the 
U.S. to remove lead pipes68 (which was banned from use in 
1986);69 as a stop gap measure, corrosion control chemicals create 
a protective film coating on the inside of pipes to reduce the 
leaching of lead from these pipes.70  The MDEQ simply failed to 
require the city to implement this proper corrosion control, and 
the corrosion of the pipes in the city caused irreversible damage 
that couldn’t be fixed by belatedly applying the corrosion control.71  
The addition of the proper, basic corrosion control to the Flint 
water supply would have cost the city approximately one hundred 
dollars per day.72 
Marc Edwards, a scientist from Virginia Tech whose team 
broke the story of the Flint contamination to the national media, 
said that the MDEQ failed to meet testing protocol of water set 
out by the EPA in critical ways.73  In February of 2015, the same 
month Lee Ann Walter’s water was tested positive for harmful 
levels of lead exposure, a state official at MDEQ inaccurately told 
an EPA official that Flint had proper corrosion control in place.74  
Additionally, the state denied that it was required to comply with 
corrosion control until further testing had been completed.75  The 
 
the-making-of-a-crisis [https://perma.cc/NUT7-N8YC ] (citing Press Release, City of 
Flint, Mich. City Hall, City of Flint Officially Begins Using Flint River as Temporary 
Primary Water Source (Apr. 25, 2014) (on file with City of Flint, Mich. City Hall). 
 66.  Ganim & Tran, supra note 19; Sherwin, supra note 4, at 688. 
 67.  Sherwin, supra note 4, at 688.  
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. at 688-89. 
 70.  Id. at 691.  
 71.  Id. at 692. 
 72.  Ganim & Tran, supra note 19. 
 73.  Sherwin, supra note 4, at 693.  
 74.  Id. at 694; Lindsey Smith, State Admits Flint Did Not Follow Federal Rules 
Designed to Keep Lead Out of Water, NPR MICH. RADIO (Oct. 18, 2015), 
http://michiganradio.org/post/state-admits-flint-did-not-follow-federal-rules-designed-
keep-lead-out-water [https://perma.cc/4MG3-MQ7H]. 
 75.  Mark Brush, Who’s to Blame for Flint’s Water Crisis? Virginia Tech 
Researcher Points the Finger at MDEQ, NPR MICH. RADIO (Oct. 1, 2015), 
http://michiganradio.org/post/whos-blame-flints-water-crisis-virginia-tech-
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state justified its sparse monitoring and quality standards by 
pointing to a change in the Lead and Copper Rule regulation in 
the year 2000, which allowed water quality departments more 
relaxed standards for reporting and monitoring.76  Edwards found 
the lead sampling the city conducted to be ineffective and 
deliberately minimizing the results with incorrect testing 
methodology.77  On July 28, 2015, the MDEQ tested seventy-one 
samples where the 90th percentile measured at 18.8 parts per 
billion with lead, notably 3.8 parts per billion higher than the 
federally mandated action level of fifteen.78  On August 20, 2015, 
two of the higher testing samples of lead parts were removed by 
the MDEQ and water operating company, which reduced the 90th 
percentile measurement down to 12.2 parts per billion.79  The 
MDEQ claimed a sampling error.80 
Marc Edwards further pointed out the failure of MDEQ 
testing in a blog post: 
 
“By law [under the Safe Water Drinking Act], at 
least 50 percent of the homes sampled must be 
verified to have lead pipe, and the remainder of 
homes sampled must have been built before 1986 
and known to have lead solder. There is no basis for 
believing that this requirement was met in either 
the 2014 or 2015 LCR sampling events conducted by 
the City. Hence, the City of Flint has not had a valid 
LCR sampling event since the switch to Flint River 
water.”81 
 
Health officials were failing in their duty to do basic testing 
of the waters, and were using the LCR as an excuse for inaction.82  
 
researcher-points-finger-mdeq [https://perma.cc/B7HA-CUBL]. 
 76.  Lead and Copper Rule: Drinking Water Requirements for States and Public 
Water Systems, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/dwreginfo/lead-
and-copper-rule [https://perma.cc/G2MH-NQCH] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017). 
 77.  Sherwin, supra note 4, at 694. 
 78.  Id. at 695.  
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Marc Edwards et al., Commentary: MDEQ Mistakes and Deception Created 
the Flint Water Crisis, FLINT WATER STUDY UPDATES (Sept. 30, 2015), 
http://flintwaterstudy.org/2015/09/commentary-mdeq-mistakes-deception-flint-water-
crisis/ [https://perma.cc/S5JW-DZ6B].   
 82.  Brush, supra note 75; Lindsey Smith, Michigan Pushes to Have Nation’s 
Toughest Lead Water Rules, NPR MICH. RADIO (Nov. 13, 2017), 
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There is also evidence that state officials outside of the MDEQ 
were concerned that the water switch was causing harm early 
on.83  In October of 2014, emails from staffers within the 
governor’s office expressed concern of a possible connection 
between the Legionnaires outbreak and the new water supply.84  
Michael Gadola, Governor Snyder’s legal counsel at the time, said 
the city “should try to get back on the Detroit system as a stopgap 
ASAP before this thing gets too far out of control.”85 
As late as July of 2015, only a few months after tests were 
showing harmful levels of lead, an MDEQ spokesman said, 
“anyone who is concerned about lead in the drinking water in 
Flint can relax.”86  Despite these huge warning flags and the 
emergence of a real public health crisis, when the federal EPA 
issued orders to Flint to act on the crisis, the MDEQ asserted that 
the EPA lacked authority to order it to do anything: 
 
We would note that under Section 1431, the 
administrator has the authority to consult with the 
State and local authorities to confirm the 
correctness of the information on which [the order] 
is based and to ascertain the action which such 
authorities are or will be taking. We welcome such a 
consultation.87 
 
As of November 22, 2016, 2.5 years after the crisis began, 
residents of Flint still did not have guaranteed access to clean 
drinking water.88  The current Mayor of Flint isn’t confident that 
 
https://www.npr.org/2017/11/13/563692086/michigan-pushes-to-have-nations-
toughest-lead-water-rules [https://perma.cc/C79F-H597]. 
 83.  Matthew Dolan & Paul Egan, Top Snyder Aides Urged Going Back to Detroit 
Water, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.freep.com 
/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/02/26/flint-water-crisis-snyder-
detroit/80926138/ [https://perma.cc/JBH2-A5GX]. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Lindsey Smith, Leaked Internal Memo Shows Federal Regulator’s Concerns 
About Lead in Flint’s Water, NPR MICH. RADIO (July 13, 2015), 
http//:michiganradio.org/post/leaked-internal-memo-shows-federal-regulator-s-
concerns-about-lead-flint-s-water [https://perma.cc/A932-G5EK]. 
 87.  Sherwin, supra note 4, at 703 (quoting Letter from Keith Creagh, Dir., Mich. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r, EPA (Jan. 22, 2016), 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-01/documents/mdeq-response_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/84X2-L9LX]).   
 88.  Katie Herzog, Flint Still Doesn’t Have Safe Drinking Water, BUS. INSIDER 
(Nov. 22, 2016). 
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she can recommend residents drink their tap water without a 
filter for at least another two years either, when crews are 
expected to finish removing every lead service line in the city.89 
B. The EPA Did Not Sound the Alarm 
The EPA also bears some blame in the agency’s decision not 
to publicly raise the alarm.  The EPA had the combination of 
complaints from Flint citizens, warnings from EPA employees, 
and the total authority through the Safe Water Drinking Act to 
act on enforcing existing law that may have prevented the worst 
damage now felt by Flint.90  Proposed solutions by the EPA ignore 
the fact that these existing regulations were simply unenforced.91  
While such regulatory changes might be a positive step, they do 
not effectively address the serious deficiencies of the inter-agency 
handling of the crisis as it unfolded. 
In July 2015, after Miguel Del Toral conducted the test 
showing lead contamination greater than twice the level of 
hazardous waste in a home, he sent a memorandum to his 
superiors: “[r]ecent drinking water sample results indicate the 
presence of high lead results in the drinking water, which is to be 
expected in a public water system that is not providing corrosion 
control treatment.”92  EPA superiors, who appeared more 
concerned with the appearance of sounding alarmist, brushed Del 
Toral’s concerns aside.93  EPA supervisor Jennifer Crooks said in 
an email, “I’ll bet that the state will take this personally since they 
are responsible . . . which isn’t a bad thing, but they may get VERY 
defensive.”94  When the internal memo was leaked to the ACLU 
 
 89.  Jonathan Oosting, Flint: ‘All Clear’ For Drinking Water Still Years Away, THE 
DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-
water-crisis/2017/03/07/flint-water-conference/98862674/ [https://perma.cc/G4KV-
943M]. 
 90.  Bosman et al., supra note 63; Safety of Public Water Systems, 42 U.S.C. § 
300i (2002); see generally Sherwin, supra note 4. 
 91.  See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, LEAD AND COPPER RULE 
REVISIONS WHITE PAPER, Oct. 26, 2016, https://www.epa.gov/sites/ 
production/files/201610/documents/508_lcr_revisions_white_paper_final_10.26.16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EAC9-UPZL]. 
 92.  ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, HIGH LEAD LEVELS IN FLINT, MICHIGAN-
INTERIM REPORT, June 24, 2015, http://flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/11/Miguels-Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQ95-M28A]. 
 93.  Todd Spangler & Paul Egan, Emails: EPA Indecision Led to Inaction in Flint 
Crisis, DETROIT FREE PRESS (May 13, 2016), http://www.freep.com/ 
story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/05/12/epa-concerns-contradictions-
flint/84299484/ [https://perma.cc/6WMU-8H2A]. 
 94.  Id. 
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in July of 2015, Region 5 director Susan Hedman apologized to 
the Flint mayor for the information not being fully vetted.95  The 
discrediting of Del Toral was underscored by the Flint Mayor’s 
statement saying, “[i]t’s dangerous for a candidate to make 
allegations that are not based on fact,” and an MDEQ spokesman 
who said, “rogue employee” wrote the report.96 
Despite the emergency powers that allow the EPA to act in 
this situation97, they appeared more interested in applying non-
public pressure to Michigan behind the scenes, as to not upset 
Michigan state officials at MDEQ.  This was evidenced by 
Jennifer Crooks in another email where she wanted to avoid the 
information coming off as “from my perspective . . . 
aggressive/controversial.”98  “If there was ever a case where [the] 
EPA should exert emergency powers and take primacy away from 
an agency, this is it,” Marc Edwards said in a statement,99 
referencing the text of the Safe Water Drinking Act which 
provides the EPA with broad authority to dictate local 
municipalities: 
 
SDWA section 1431, 42 U.S.C. §300i gives the EPA 
Administrator broad authority to act to protect the 
health of persons in situations where there may be 
an imminent and substantial endangerment. 
Specifically, section 1431 provides that, upon 
receipt of information that a contaminant that 
is present in or likely to enter a public water 
system or an underground source of drinking 
water, or there is a threatened or potential terrorist 
attack or other intentional act, that may present an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to the 
health of persons, the EPA Administrator may 
take any action she deems necessary to protect 
human health.100 
 
 95.  Lindsey Smith, After Blowing the Whistle on Flint’s Water, EPA “Rogue 
Employee” Been Silent. Until Now, MICH. RADIO (Jan. 21, 2016), 
http://michiganradio.org/post/after-blowing-whistle-flints-water-epa-rogue-employee-
has-been-silent-until-now [https://perma.cc/J9JV-QLNJ]. 
 96.  Id.; The EPA Flint Abdication, THE WALL STREET J. (Mar. 17, 2016) 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-epas-flint-abdication-1458258027 [https://perma.cc/ 
S47B-7CW4]. 
 97.  Brush, supra note 75.  
 98.  Spangler & Egan, supra note 93.  
 99.  Brush, supra note 75. 
 100.  Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and Federal Facilities: Enforcement, U.S. 
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The failure to act on this authority in the face of an unfolding 
catastrophe showcases a toxic political environment.  It was 
deemed less harmful for administrators in Michigan and the EPA 
to simply sit on its hands, ignoring irrefutable evidence that 
something was terribly wrong, than to act in the public interest. 
IV. CAUSES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 
In proposing solutions, agencies and authors including the 
EPA, suggest making changes to the Safe Water Drinking Act, the 
LCR, in addition to providing better education for local 
municipalities, and generally requiring better reporting to bring 
concerns forward faster.101  But what these solutions ignore is 
that the EPA had sufficient emergency authority powers to 
respond to the Flint crisis like the extreme environmental 
catastrophe it was.102 
Michigan state officials—like those at the MDEQ—had 
ample information to understand the basic dangers the Flint 
water had.103  Furthermore, both officials in Michigan and the 
EPA disregarded and lied about clear evidence that Flint’s water 
had effectively been poisoned, and that its citizens were 
experiencing harmful effects.104  The proposed reforms that target 
the alleged confusion in water control action might be welcomed 
by public observers, but the notion that these reforms would have 
prevented the Flint crisis neglects to address the criminal 
negligence of MDEQ officials.105  It should have been obvious with 
basic research to MDEQ workers that the Flint water was toxic 
and corrosive.  Clear warning signs went ignored even after 
numerous complaints.106  Failures to admit or recognize these 
facts has created a severe health crisis that could result in the cost 
of hundreds of millions of dollars in social and economic costs for 
Flint, a city already reeling from the decline of the auto 
 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/safe-drinking-water-
act-sdwa-and-federal-facilities [https://perma.cc/742G-HEEC], (last visited Oct. 29, 
2017) (emphasis added). 
 101.  Sherwin, supra note 4, at 719. 
 102.  Safety of Public Water Systems, 42 U.S.C. § 300hh (2006). 
 103.  See Sherwin, supra note 4. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Sara Ganim & Ray Sanchez, Flint Water Crisis: New Criminal Charges Are 
Brought, CNN (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/29/us/flint-water-crisis-
charges/ [https://perma.cc/XC9C-5WDZ]. 
 106.  Id.  
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industry.107 
The EPA should have recognized the Flint water crisis 
unfolding as a major public health emergency that required 
immediate action.  The EPA’s hesitance to sound public alarm 
bells represents a horrifying failure of the core of what a federal 
environmental agency is supposed to do. The necessary 
regulations for the EPA to act were present and totally 
sufficient.108  It rightly thought that it had proper authority to 
intervene when it did, and yet it still waited nearly a year after 
the initial reporting level for lead contamination was met and 
internally reported by one of its agents.109 
A better problem to address might be the institutional 
culture that has contributed to the behaviors of state and federal 
agencies here.  What could be a far more determinative factor in 
causing this crisis are the cold realities of finance and politics.110  
The EPA is now a frequent target to the most critical 
condemnations and political battles in Washington.111  In June of 
2015, Republicans in the House Appropriations Committee 
passed a bill that slashed the EPA’s funding by nine percent.112  
The committee chair hailed the cuts as necessary to rein in an 
“unnecessary, job-killing regulatory agenda.”113  Senate Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnell called Obama administration regulatory 
actions “an all-out assault on the American economy.”114  In 
January, 2016, a year after the Flint crisis became a national 
news story, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan wrote an op-ed 
criticizing unrelated water regulations the EPA was proposing: 
“Congress will continue to make sure people who depend upon 
 
 107.  Josh Sanburn, Flint Water Crisis May Cost the City $400 Million in Long 
Term Social Costs, TIME (Aug. 8, 2016), http://time.com/4441471/flint-water-lead-
poisoning-costs/ [https://perma.cc/X3EB-YS47]. 
 108.  Safety of Public Water Systems, 42 U.S.C. § 300 (2006). 
 109.  Smith, supra note 95.  
 110.  Sherwin, supra note 4, at 697.  
 111.  Jack Fitzpatrick, Cuts to EPA Staff Would Entail Political Battle Over 
Regional Offices, MORNING CONSULT (Apr. 24, 2017), https://morningconsult.com 
/2017/04/24/cuts-epa-staff-entail-political-battle-regional-offices/ [https://perma.cc/ 
FU9H-XKRK]. 
 112.  Devin Henry, House Panel Approves $30.17B Bill Cutting EPA Funds, 
Blocking Rules, THE HILL (June 16, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-
environment/245137-house-panel-approves-3017b-bill-to-cut-epa-funds-block-climate 
[https://perma.cc/UE6N-HNFG]. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Geof Koss, Tempers Flare as Senate Panel Oks Interior-EPA Spending Bill, 
GREENWIRE (June 18, 2015), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060020491 
[https://perma.cc/2Z5S-E8VY]. 
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this indispensable resource are not imperiled by an overzealous 
federal bureaucracy.”115  Lawsuits regarding proposed power 
plant and water regulations against the EPA have become 
increasingly common as well.116 
The point is not that everything the EPA proposes or does is 
good or bad.  The point is that the EPA is now seen by many states 
and conservative leaders as an enemy regulatory agency and 
political tool of radical environmental policy.  As a result, the EPA 
is facing a declining budget, numerous lawsuits, and severe 
pushback from states.117  Given all of this, it is easier to 
understand why the director of the EPA region overseeing Flint, 
especially after reading Del Toral’s report, tried to quietly apply 
pressure to MDEQ officials to start adding proper corrosion 
control rather than asserting EPA emergency authority against a 
state in the face of a public health catastrophe.118  The political 
willpower to insert itself into the negligent action of state officials 
carries necessary blowback.  In released emails, EPA employees 
expressed concern about the defensiveness they were likely to get 
from telling MDEQ about problems in Flint.119  And indeed, state 
officials at MDEQ were openly defiant until the crisis was in full 
swing.120  Spokesmen and others in Michigan continually assured 
Flint residents their water was fine, even though they were being 
given every indication that it was not.121  The EPA has exercised 
its emergency powers under section 1431 before,122 but the agency 
has never faced the kind of local governmental pushback that it 
has received from Michigan officials during this crisis. 
 
 115.  Paul Ryan, Water Rules Show EPA’s Overreach, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD 
(Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.omaha.com/opinion/paul-ryan-water-rules-show-epa-s-
overreach/article_79487f96-cca1-5afa-a194-4d63a398c2aa.html [https://perma.cc/H4 
3U-PR5P]. 
 116.  Timothy Cama, Two Dozen States Sue Obama Over Coal Plant Emissions 
Rule, THE HILL (Oct. 23, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/257856-
24-states-coal-company-sue-obama-over-climate-rule [https://perma.cc/GF8E-6EJ2]. 
 117.  Id.; see also Henry, supra note 112. 
 118.  Spangler & Egan, supra note 93. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  E-mail from Keith Creagh, Dir. Of Mich. Dep’t. of Envtl. Quality, to Gina 
McCarthy, Adm’r U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency (Jan. 22, 2016) (on file with the Dep’t 
of Envtl. Quality). 
 121.  Kennedy, supra note 65. 
 122.  U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ON 
CONSENT (Mar. 19, 2013), https://www3.epa.gov/region10/pdf/sites/yaki 
magw/consent_order_yakima_valley_dairies_march2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/454N-
GTPN]; U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ON 
CONSENT (Nov. 20, 2006), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-05/ 
documents/sdwadupont06.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE9N-43DN]. 
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Michigan officials at all levels were under intense pressure 
to squeeze the budgets of troubled cities like Detroit and Flint, 
and were disregarding common sense measures of public health 
and safety.123  Emergency managers like the one in Flint are put 
in charge to manage the city with the purpose of getting the deficit 
under control.  These managers act as political appointees with 
no local accountability to the people that are most impacted by 
these decisions.124  Critical observers have noted the 
disproportionate effect on the poor and minority communities of 
Flint, even suggesting that officials would be less likely to ignore 
such warning signs in more affluent, white communities.125  A 
pragmatic view from the eyes of Michigan officials obsessed with 
budgetary matters makes a crisis such as this all but inevitable, 
particularly for a poor community like Flint.126  In the wake of the 
financial crisis that squeezed state resources, the most pressing 
concern in their eyes was the red ink in the budget.  As of June 
14, 2017, fifteen people, including two former emergency 
managers of Flint, have been charged by Michigan’s Attorney 
General for crimes related to the crisis ranging from involuntary 
manslaughter to obstruction of justice.127 
V. PREVENTING FUTURE FLINTS 
A. Immediate Relief 
Flint is one of many aging industrial cities that were at risk 
for a manmade catastrophe such as this.128  The EPA has flagged 
many other cities in the rust belt, like Milwaukee, WI, as having 
the same kinds of risks with lead pipes delivering drinking 
water.129  Even replacing these lead lines for houses in cities can 
 
 123.  Bosman et al., supra note 83. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Shawna J. Lee et al., Racial Inequality and the Implementation of Emergency 
Management Laws in Economically Distressed Urban Areas, 70 CHILD AND YOUTH 
SERVICES REV. 1, 1, 6 (2016). 
 126.  Bosman et al., supra note 83. 
 127.  Sara Ganim, Michigan Officials Charged in Flint Legionnaires’ Outbreak, 
CNN (June 14, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/14/health/flint-water-crisis-
legionnaires-manslaughter-charges/index.html [https://perma.cc/DA7D-W3NR]. 
 128.  Michael Wines & John Schwartz, Unsafe Lead Levels in Tap Water Not 
Limited to Flint, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2jLogr4 
[https://perma.cc/L8NZ-JCWS]. 
 129.  John Seewer & David Eggert, Lead Pipes Lurk in Older Neighborhoods Across 
the Nation, SUN-SENTINEL (Jan. 23, 2016), http://www.sun-
sentinel.com/news/nationworld/sfl-lead-pipes-lurk-in-older-neighborhoods-across-the-
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disturb the water systems and release toxic flakes.130  Short of an 
entire infrastructure upgrade in both public and private property 
throughout these cities, the danger of lead or other harmful 
contamination to water supplies will be prone to potential 
bureaucratic failures or changes in water chemistry. 
The solution to both the problems of institutional indifference 
in enforcing regulation and decrepit water infrastructure must 
come from the federal government.  State governments, usually 
by law, cannot run budget deficits.131  Their resources and tax 
bases are smaller, and the problems of water infrastructure 
investment will cost billions for nearly every state government, 
and by some estimates, up to several trillion dollars 
nationwide.132  Contamination issues and lack of supply without 
these upgrades will cost local economies like those in Flint 
millions of dollars in worker output and domestic spending.133  
The federal government, on the other hand, is not under the 
constraint of running a balanced budget, as it can issue debt.134  
It has the resources, but currently lacks the will to make the 
massive investment needed to make base level improvements in 
public health.  Current programs like the Drinking Water State 
Revolving Fund and Clean Water State Revolving Fund provide 
capitalization grants and financing mechanisms to provide local 
infrastructure upgrades.135  However, the improvements are 
financially too small to make a large impact on national 
infrastructure, and are at best stopgap measures to a national 
problem that could lead to public health crises like Flint.  In the 
short term, what is widely accepted is the need for Flint and 
similarly situated cities to provide lead filters to at risk residents 
 
nation-20160123-story.html [https://perma.cc/2QP2-YYKZ]. 
 130.  Cheryl Corley, Chicago’s Upgrades to Aging Water Lines May Disturb Lead 
Pipes, NPR (Apr. 14, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/04/14/474130954/chicagos-
upgrades-to-aging-water-lines-may-disturb-lead-pipes [https://perma.cc/T266-L3H8]. 
 131.  NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, STATE BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Apr. 12, 1999), http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-
balanced-budget-requirements.aspx [https://perma.cc/M8XY-Z6N7]. 
 132.  2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, AM. SOC’Y OF CIV. ENGINEERS 
1, 5 (Mar. 2013),  http://2013.infrastructurereportcard.org/ [https://perma.cc/Q7CP-
CEAQ]. 
 133.  Sanburn, supra note 107. 
 134. GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40767, HOW TREASURY ISSUES 
DEBT (2016).  
 135.  U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, LEARN ABOUT THE CLEAN WATER STATE 
REVOLVING FUND (CWSRF) (2017), https://www.epa.gov/cwsrf/learn-about-clean-
water-state-revolving-fund-cwsrf [https://perma.cc/LD2A-ZE4G]. 
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who may have lead service lines.136  A combination of local, state, 
and federal government funding needs to be allocated to these 
communities immediately to prevent the present and real threat 
of lead exposure, particularly for children, who are most at risk.  
In the past twenty years, there have been great strides in new 
filtration technologies like Granular Activated Carbon (GAC), 
which has a lead removal effectiveness of over ninety-nine 
percent, while also requiring only a fraction of operating costs 
compared to other standard brand filters.137  The best short-term 
solution is to apply massive and immediate filtration investment 
to communities with lead pipes, delaying and mitigating the 
potential long term social and economic costs associated with 
accidental lead exposure through water systems, and therefore 
providing the necessary relief of emergency conditions to allow the 
fostering of carefully drafted plans by experts and lawmakers for 
the long term. 
B. Solutions for the Future 
For long-term solutions to lead contamination in the water 
supply, the United States will need to upgrade its entire aging 
water infrastructure system, including replacing all the lead 
service lines nationwide.  What the federal government needs to 
do is supercharge the funding for water structure and water 
quality upgrades throughout the country in both infrastructure 
spending and EPA enforcement.  These are basic public health 
investments that could boost economic activity, create thousands 
of infrastructure jobs, and prevent more man-made catastrophe 
like Flint from happening in the future.  This funding will relieve 
pressures on state budgets and embolden the EPA to act with 
greater authority for the public good.  The logistics of creating 
such legislation and enforcement are straightforward.  The 
challenges of such legislation come from the political difficulty of 
pushing through a bill with the price tag of trillions of dollars in 
a clash of political will and fiscal choice. 
But the costs of not upgrading the United States’ water 
infrastructure are devastating.138  Estimates on the current 
 
 136.  Jonathan Oosting & Michael Gerstein, Expert: Withouht Filter, No Water Safe 
From Lead Pipes, Detroit News (Spet. 28, 2016), 
http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/michigan/flint-water-
crisis/2016/09/28/snyder-flint-water-crisis/91213822/ [https://perma.cc/E3ND-QYPQ]. 
 137.  Mohamed Ahmedna et al., The Use of Nutshell Carbons in Drinking Water 
Filters for Removal of Trace Metals, 38 WATER RESEARCH 1062, 1066-1067 (2004). 
 138.  Am. Soc’y of Civ. Engineers, supra note 133, at 18. 
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amount of water wasted each day in the United States through 
leaky infrastructure total to around seven billion gallons per 
day.139  An increasing population, the potential effects of climate 
change, and contamination issues on a strained water supply will 
only exacerbate the current water shortages that much of the 
country faces.140  And it’s not just California that would be 
effected.  Forty states are projected to have water shortages in the 
next few years, according to a Government Accountability Office 
Survey in 2013.141  These conditions have the potential to 
downsize prospects for economic growth and standards of living 
for people all around the United States.  The United States could 
greatly benefit in treating water more like the precious 
commodity it is.  By instituting real pricing for water and 
committing to strenuous conservation policies practiced by less 
water rich nations,142 the United States could control water costs 
and assure sufficient national supplies during periods of drought 
or stress. 
If water shortages and quality concerns are not enough to 
entice lawmakers into large infrastructure projects, perhaps the 
estimated economic benefits would.  The Economic Policy 
Institute estimates that with just $250 billion of debt financed 
investment into infrastructure projects, the United States 
economy would expand by $400 billion, with a net increase of 
three million jobs and increased levels of employment over the 
seven-year life of that investment.143  Such investments would 
also potentially improve economy wide productivity growth.144  
The savings from a reduction in water loss would also help, given 
 
 139.  Adam James, The U.S. Wastes 7 Billion Gallons of Drinking Water a Day: Can 
Innovation Help Solve the Problem?, THINK PROGRESS (Nov. 3, 2011), 
https://thinkprogress.org/the-u-s-wastes-7-billion-gallons-of-drinking-water-a-day-
can-innovation-help-solve-the-problem-f7877d6e3574/ [https://perma.cc/BM9M-
9GDE]. 
 140.  James McBride, The Beleagured U.S. Water System, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS (July 8, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/beleaguered-us-water-
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the cost of pumping seven billion gallons of water per day that 
goes to waste.145  Those water savings could be rolled into new 
agriculture or industrial development, as well as improving 
municipal functions and costs.  These economic benefits would 
provide an infrastructure upgrade that could be the foundation 
for further growth and better urban development. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
What should be the final motivating straw for lawmakers, 
however, is looking at the devastating effects of water 
contamination that to this day are plaguing Flint.146  The 
economic impact and social costs of dealing with the crisis will not 
be fully realized for decades.147  While the fixes proposed by 
legislators to require notifying the public of water quality issues 
or requiring clarifiers in the Lead Copper Rules aren’t 
meaningless, the emergency regulatory mechanisms were already 
in place for the EPA to enforce failures in inspection and water 
treatment in Flint.148  These mechanisms were either ignored or 
not given proper weight to the magnitude of the developing 
problems in the city.  It just isn’t clear that anything will be as 
effective at preventing another Flint crisis in the short term but 
the embarrassment of the EPA and MDEQ officials. But that 
embarrassment will eventually subside.  The EPA has flexed its 
ability to exercise emergency authority powers before under 
section 1431, particularly against private entities.149  But this 
author could not find a comparable instance in which the EPA was 
under the pressure of state and local government resisting and 
disputing facts on the ground.  Proposed legislative fixes requiring 
stricter standards simply reinforce what was already the job of 
both state and federal agencies.150  But a dedication to water 
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infrastructure innovation at the federal level would relieve some 
of the budgetary pressures off these agencies and other state 
governments to hopefully discourage future negligent or careless 
action.  In March of 2017, the EPA awarded $100 million to 
Michigan to improve water infrastructure in Flint.151  This much 
needed funding was supplemented by the State of Michigan after 
it agreed to settle a class action lawsuit and set aside $97 million 
to replace the water lines of at least eighteen thousand Flint 
households by 2020.152  In continuing to pursue the dire needs of 
water infrastructure repair, this country has the opportunity to 
make major improvements in national public health, and to head 
off future disastrous water crises like Flint. 
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